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Abstract
This article develops an account of distributive epistemic justice in the
production of scientific knowledge. We identify four requirements: (a) sci-
ence should produce the knowledge citizens need in order to reason about the
common good, their individual good and pursuit thereof; (b) science should
produce the knowledge those serving the public need to pursue justice ef-
fectively; (c) science should be organized in such a way that it does not aid
the wilful manufacturing of ignorance; and (d) when making decisions about
epistemic risks, scientists should make sure that there aren’t social groups or
weighty interests that are neglected. After discussing these requirements, we
examine the relationship between discriminatory and distributive epistemic
injustice in science and argue that they often compound each other.
1 Introduction
In her ground-breaking book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Know-
ing [2007], Miranda Fricker introduced the idea of epistemic injustice and dis-
tinguished between testimonial and hermeneutical injustices. Testimonial injus-
tice arises when a speaker is wronged by a hearer who assigns a deflated level of
credibility to the former’s assertion due to prejudice against their social identity.
Hermeneutical injustice arises when a someone is deprived of conceptual resources
that enable them and others to make sense of their individual experiences due to
hermeneutical marginalization in society. In her book, Fricker considered the un-
fair distribution of epistemic goods such as education and information but only to
set it aside as not being ‘distinctively epistemic’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 1).
However, David Coady forcefully argued that unjust distributions of epistemic
goods were epistemic injustices since ‘it is not at all incidental that epistemic goods,
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such as information and education, can be characterised as epistemic’ ([2010], p.
101). Such injustices, he argued, were irreducible to other distributive injustices and
mattered much in the same way as unjust distribution of economic goods. Hence,
Coady formulated distributive epistemic injustice as ‘injustice in the distribution
of the epistemic good of knowledge’ (Coady, 2010, p. 112). As a result, Fricker
extended her conceptualization of epistemic injustice to cover distributive epistemic
injustice, by which she means ‘someone’s receiving less than their fair share of an
epistemic good such as education, or access to expert advice or information’ (Fricker,
2017, p. 53).
Thus, the question of epistemic injustice in science can be approached from two
perspectives: the perspective of discriminatory epistemic injustice, a broader cate-
gory Fricker later adopts to describe testimonial and hermeneutical injustices, and
the perspective of distributive epistemic injustice. There is a growing body of re-
search on discriminatory epistemic injustice in science. In addition to Heidi Grass-
wick’s [2017] general account of the phenomenon, there are studies that examine
it in the context of specific sciences and their applications, such as medicine and
psychiatry, and proposals for remedying it (Carel and Kidd, 2014, Bueter, 2019,
Crichton et al., 2017, Koskinen and Rolin, 2019). Distributive epistemic in/justice
in science, however, remains under-theorized. Although we owe the concept of dis-
tributive epistemic injustice to the exchange between Fricker and Coady, they have
not developed it beyond the general formulation given above, much less to apply
it to scientific knowledge production. In fact, Coady explicitly says that questions
about the correct principles of distributive epistemic justice are beyond the scope of
his paper (Coady, 2010, p. 104).1
Earlier several philosophers discussed this issue in the context of access to infor-
mation without, though, employing the apt concept of distributive epistemic jus-
tice. For example, Jeroen van den Hoven and Emma Rooksby (2008) have argued
that access to ‘informative objects’ such as books and databases is a primary good in
the Rawlsian sense and therefore subject to Rawls’ principles of distributive justice.
Don Fallis has explored how different theories of justice could be incorporated into
Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology (Fallis, 2007).
One shortcoming of this literature has been its focus on the dissemination of
existing knowledge and the concomitant neglect of prior questions regarding the
production of knowledge. This makes them ill-suited to the study of distributive
epistemic in/justice in science. The framework recently offered by Faik Kurtulmus
and Gürol Irzik [2017] and Kurtulmus [2020] remedies this to a significant extent.
They argue that that although knowledge, understood as true belief, is a primary
1In a later publication Coady argues that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are actually
distributive in nature since the former involves an unfair distribution of credibility and the latter
involves ‘unequal access to participation in the generation of social meanings’ (Coady, 2017, p. 65).
While there is certainly room for a discussion of distributive epistemic in/justice within the scientific
community from this perspective, our approach is different in that we are primarily concerned with the
structural features of scientific knowledge production in relation to the knowledge needs of citizens
and public officials. See below.
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good, the object of distributive justice is the opportunity to acquire knowledge one
has an objective interest in. The distribution of the opportunity to acquire knowl-
edge is determined by ‘the epistemic basic structure of a society’, which is the set
of institutions responsible for the production and dissemination of knowledge as
well as ensuring that people can assimilate this knowledge. While their framework
explicitly includes science as a major institution for knowledge production, their
discussion of it is limited.
This article aims to fill this lacuna by presenting an overview of the ways in
which distributive epistemic justice plays out in scientific knowledge production.
In Section 2 we summarize Kurtulmus and Irzik’s framework. In Section 3 we dis-
tinguish between primary and secondary distributive epistemic injustices in science:
while the former occurs when science fails to provide citizens with an equal oppor-
tunity obtain the knowledge they need, the latter arises when it fails to provide
officials with the knowledge necessary for the pursuit of justice. We illustrate these
in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In Section 6 we discuss how the use of science
for wilful manufacturing of ignorance constitutes yet another form of distributive
injustice. In Section 7 we argue that the inductive and epistemic risks in scien-
tific research also give rise to claims of distributive epistemic justice. One of the
key lessons that emerge from paying attention to distributive epistemic in/justice in
science is that different forms of epistemic injustice can interact with and compound
each other. In Section 8 we show how various forms of discriminatory injustice are
related to distributive epistemic injustice in science. We conclude by noting the
holistic nature of distributive epistemic justice in science: achieving it is not just a
matter of the proper functioning of the institution of science, but of the epistemic
basic structure as a whole.
2 The Epistemic Basic Structure and Justice
Kurtulmus and Irzik define the epistemic basic structure of a society as those institu-
tions that have the greatest impact on people’s opportunity to acquire knowledge on
issues they have an objective interest in as individuals, citizens and public officials.
The epistemic basic structure is responsible for the distribution of the opportunity
to acquire knowledge. This involves three processes: the production of knowledge,
its dissemination, and ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate what
is disseminated by providing them with the necessary educational background and
intellectual skills. Throughout this paper, when we speak of the distribution of
knowledge or the distribution of the opportunity to acquire knowledge, we refer to
the outcome of all three processes, not just to the dissemination of existing knowl-
edge.
The epistemic basic structure includes institutions of science and education,
media, search engines, public libraries, museums, and various governmental offices
that carry out research such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Food and
Drug Administration in the USA. These institutions are naturally bound by the
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principles of justice, such as non-discrimination and respect for individuals’ rights,
that apply to all social institutions. Kurtulmus and Irzik argue that there are at
least two further requirements of justice that apply specifically to the epistemic ba-
sic structure. First, it should serve individuals fairly and provide them with an
equal opportunity to gain knowledge in order to reason about the common good,
their individual good and pursuit thereof unless there are overriding reasons for an
unequal distribution. Knowledge is no less important than material resources in
enabling individuals to lead flourishing lives and exercise their rights effectively.
Lack of knowledge about how to protect one’s health can harm a person just as lack
of access to healthcare does. Similarly, lack of knowledge can hinder the effective
exercise of a person’s political rights as much as lack of economic resources. While
people do have some epistemic agency and responsibility, they are dependent on
the epistemic basic structure of their society: if the knowledge people need is not
produced or not disseminated in a way they can access or if they lack the necessary
education to understand what is disseminated, their ability to reflect on and pursue
their individual ends and the common good will be harmed.
Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowl-
edge public officials need for the design and effective implementation of just laws
and policies. The pursuit of justice in the economic sphere, the pursuit of equality
of opportunity, the provision of healthcare to citizens, the protection of the envi-
ronment, and the reliable functioning of the criminal justice system all depend on
legislators and public officials having the requisite knowledge.
By knowledge Kurtulmus and Irzik mean true belief, that is, they adopt Gold-
man’s account of weak knowledge and follow him in being concerned primarily with
truth in assessing social institutions from an epistemic perspective [1997].2 How-
ever, even if the epistemic basic structure functions well and individuals do their
best, it is impossible to guarantee that they will always end up with knowledge in
this sense. This is in part because scientific inquiry is fallible. Nevertheless, when
conducted well, scientific research can be reliable in the sense that its findings have
a high probability of being true. Indeed, the more reliable the research people have
access to, the greater their chances of attaining true beliefs. Hence, while the ul-
timate goal of the epistemic basic structure should be to provide citizens with the
opportunity to acquire knowledge in the sense of true beliefs, science policies that
aim at it will seek to promote reliable inquiry.
Kurtulmus and Irzik do not offer an in-depth account of the demands of dis-
tributive epistemic justice that falls on specific institutions that make up the epis-
temic basic structure. As we shall demonstrate, there is much to be gained from
attending to their particularities.3 In this paper we provide an overview of what dis-
2For their rationale see Kurtulmus and Irzik, 2017, p. 130.
3The use of Kurtulmus and Irzik’s Rawls-inspired framework does not commit us to either ideal
or non-ideal theorizing. They are engaged in what Hamlin and Stemplowska call ‘a theory of ideals’,
which aims ‘to identify, elucidate and clarify the nature of an ideal or ideals’ ([2012], p. 53). As they
point out, with a theory of an ideal at hand, one can inquire into how it can be pursued in ideal or
non-ideal conditions.
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tributive epistemic justice requires of science as a source of knowledge for citizens
and public officials who serve them. This requires attending to research agendas
and practices, the application of scientific research and the institutional context that
shapes them. There are also issues of distributive epistemic justice within the scien-
tific community. The accessibility of data, the intellectual property rights regime as
it relates to scientific research, and the commercial model of academic publishing
all give rise to issues of distributive epistemic injustice within science. While these
are certainly important and interact with our question of how fairly science serves
society, we leave them out for reasons of scope.
3 Primary and Secondary Distributive Epistemic Justice
We find it helpful to distinguish between two kinds of injustice that pertain to the
distribution of scientific knowledge. Primary distributive epistemic justice is con-
cerned with the knowledge ordinary citizens need. It requires that science produce
reliable research that meets knowledge needs of all groups in a society regardless
of their race, ethnicity, class, religion, and gender. If a society has the necessary
resources but its scientific institutions do not provide knowledge people have an
objective interest in or does so unfairly, giving undue priority to some over others,
then the ensuing deprivation of the opportunity to acquire knowledge itself consti-
tutes an injustice that we call ‘primary distributive epistemic injustice’.
Primary distributive epistemic justice does not require that everyone should al-
ways enjoy an equal opportunity to have knowledge. Other demands of justice may
provide overriding reasons for an unequal distribution. Inequalities are also permis-
sible when they are necessary for an efficient division of epistemic labour in society
that benefits everyone or for the effective pursuit of public goals. For this reason, it
is not unjust, for example, if scientists or public officials enjoy better opportunities
to acquire knowledge in order to carry out their specialized tasks.
‘Secondary distributive epistemic justice’ is concerned with the production of
scientific knowledge public officials need for carrying out their tasks required by
justice, such as providing health care, designing and implementing effective social
and environmental policies, and maintaining a fair legal system. Injustice in this
context arises when public officials commit or fail to remedy injustices because of a
lack of scientific knowledge due to a poor or unfair social organization of scientific
research.
Primary and secondary distributive epistemic injustice can come about because
of the way scientific research agendas are set and how research is conducted. Thus,
an account of distributive epistemic justice will be incomplete if it is only concerned
with the dissemination of existing knowledge. It has to take the production of
knowledge into account. It is here that science plays a crucial role.
Distributive epistemic justice does not apply to all scientific knowledge. In-
equalities in the opportunity to acquire knowledge or the absence of research about,
for instance, the formation of black holes is not an injustice. More generally, sci-
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entific research that has no impact on individual welfare or public policy does not
give rise to claims of justice. It is the connection between the need for knowledge
and already existing requirements of justice that give rise to questions of distributive
epistemic justice. The underlying thought can be summed up as follows: When-
ever (i) there is a reason of justice to take public action to protect or promote certain
individual interests; and (ii) the provision of knowledge to individuals or to public
officials who serve them can help protect or promote those interests, there is a pro
tanto reason of justice for the provision of this knowledge–which means there is a
pro tanto reason to produce and disseminate it and enable people to make use of it.
For this reason, the question of which specific epistemic needs of citizens and
society as a whole ground claims of justice, and which needs have priority should
be settled with reference to a general theory of distributive justice. There can be
accounts based on, for instance, Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach or wel-
farist prioritarianism. Kurtulmus and Irzik adopt Rawls’s theory of justice. They
argue that knowledge that bears on individuals’ life plans and deliberations about
the common good is a primary good and its distribution a matter of justice. Further-
more, they hold that the epistemic basic structure should aid the pursuit of Rawls’s
principles of justice (Kurtulmus, 2020; Kurtulmus and Irzik, 2017). In what fol-
lows, we present cases involving individuals’ epistemic needs that bear on people’s
health and the quality of their environment, and social policies that shape the econ-
omy, environmental regulations and healthcare. These are all scientific issues most
theories of distributive justice will recognize as morally significant.
Inequalities or lack of knowledge due to what might be called epistemic bad
luck are also not unjust.4 Some facts are harder than others to discover because of
the way the world is or because of our current stock of scientific knowledge. Some-
times, there are good faith errors in scientific research. Inequalities arising from
such factors are unfortunate but do not constitute distributive epistemic injustice.5
4 Producing Knowledge People Need
We have claimed that it is a requirement of primary distributive epistemic justice
that science produce the knowledge ordinary citizens need in their deliberations
about the common good, their personal good and their pursuit. In this context sci-
entific knowledge ordinary citizens rely on does not have to be extensive or deep. It
is the type of knowledge expressed in such statements as ‘Smoking causes lung can-
cer’, ‘The mumps-measles-rubella vaccine is generally safe and effective’, ‘Wearing a
mask and physical distancing help reduce the spreading of the COVID-19’, ‘Burn-
ing fossil fuel contributes to environmental pollution and global warming’ and the
like. To the extent that such statements are derived from scientific research, they do
4We thank one of the referees of this journal for this suggestion.
5It’s worth noting a certain difficulty. Given that our current stock of knowledge is influenced
by past choices which may reflect various injustices, current difficulties may not always exculpate and
may require remedial action.
6
embody scientific knowledge, albeit in a simple and condensed form that the public
can understand and use in making their life plans. The type and depth of scientific
knowledge laypeople need will be no doubt relative to their purposes. Generally
speaking, ordinary citizens do not need to know the research behind it. Yet the sci-
entific research that supports it needs to exist. If it is lacking or unreliable or based
on populations different from them in significant ways—and is, hence inapplicable
or misleading for them—their epistemic needs will not be served.
Institutions of science serve primary distributive epistemic justice through the
production of knowledge. However, their role is not limited to this. Without
claiming to be exhaustive, we note two further duties. The dissemination of scien-
tific knowledge to citizens will be mostly through the media and the education sys-
tem. Nevertheless, the chain of communication starts with scientists, often through
press releases issued by university press offices. Scientists and their institutions have
a duty to make their initial communications accurate and informative for the pub-
lic, paying due attention to their epistemic needs. If these initial statements are
exaggerated, as a recent study suggests they are, then the public will not be properly
informed (Sumner et al. [2014]).
Reliable scientific research and its accurate dissemination is not sufficient to
ensure its uptake by members of the public. They also have to trust scientists. For
this to be the case, science should not only be trustworthy, but also seen to be trust-
worthy. Thus, the organization of science should signal its trustworthiness to the
public by minimizing conflicts of interest and demonstrating scientists’ adherence
to the norms of science.
Addressing the needs of victims of what Grasswick calls ‘epistemic trust injus-
tice’ requires further steps. Epistemic trust injustices occur when some people, due
to past interactions with experts, have reasons to distrust them. For instance, given
the history of research abuse, like the notorious Tuskegee Syphilis Study, African
Americans have reasons to be distrustful of medical researchers and doctors. This
makes it harder for them to benefit from the information provided to them (Grass-
wick, 2018). In such cases, bringing about distributive epistemic justice requires
taking the necessary steps to enable African Americans to have well-placed trust in
medical professionals and medical research.
To make the idea of primary distributive epistemic justice in science more con-
crete and illustrate the complex questions that arise in this context, we present the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) hazard assessment in New Orleans
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.6 Hurricane Katrina had carried, along with
salt water, sediments and chemicals that were possibly toxic. The residents of the
neighbourhoods who were considering returning to their homes depended on the
EPA’s research for finding out if it was safe to do so. The EPA did extensive testing
in the flooded parts of New Orleans collecting approximately 1,800 sediment and
6Scott Frickel and his collaborators have studied the EPA’s effort with a view to assessing how
well it has served the public’s informational needs (Frickel et al., 2009; Frickel and Vincent, 2011;
Frickel, 2014). We follow their account.
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soil samples and carrying out analyses for the presence of almost 200 contaminants.
However, their ‘knowledge investments’–‘the time, money, technologies, expertise
and other resources that EPA expended in collecting soil and sediment samples, re-
turning to sampling locations for follow-up sampling, and performing tests on the
sampled material’–was not evenly distributed across neighbourhoods (Frickel et al.,
2009, p. 123). Contrary to what one might expect, there was more knowledge
investment in poorer and disproportionately African American neighbourhoods.
This was not because these neighbourhoods suffered disproportionately from
flooding. The unequal distribution of knowledge investments was an outcome of
the EPA’s sampling strategies and public pressure. After an initial citywide round
of sample collection and testing, the EPA focused its efforts on a few hotspots.
These were either sites that contained chemical concentrations that, under existing
regulatory standards, required further action or pre-existing hazardous waste sites
that were the subject of public concern. This did not mean that neighbourhoods
not singled out as hotspots were free of chemicals. Many of them had heavy metals
and industrial chemicals in their soil but at lower levels. There were also several
areas that were not sampled at all. Given that many of these hotspots were neigh-
bourhoods already known to contain hazardous waste-sites, Frickel and colleagues
argue, the EPA’s testing strategies did not provide the residents of these neighbour-
hoods with much new information (Frickel et al., 2009, p. 131). The residents of
neighbourhoods that received less knowledge investment also were not well-served.
Obviously, people in neighbourhoods where no samples were collected did not re-
ceive any information. People in neighbourhoods where testing stopped after the
first round of sample collection and testing also could not be confident that it was
safe to return to their homes. The EPA’s testing strategy, in effect, sought to mini-
mize false positives by stopping testing in neighbourhoods where they did not find
contaminants at levels high enough to trigger further action.
The failure to satisfactorily inform the residents of New Orleans about the safety
of returning was not solely due to the EPA. The EPA did not have peer reviewed
studies for the carcinogenicity of 70% of the contaminants found in New Orleans.
Thus, Frickel and Vincent maintain that ‘despite official assurances to the contrary,
no one really knows what hazards remain’ ([2011], p. 12).
This case contains several lessons regarding primary distributive epistemic injus-
tice. First, it is not easy to determine when there is such an injustice.7 While knowl-
edge investments were distributed unequally across different neighbourhoods, we
cannot conclude that this was unjust. What fundamentally matters is not the distri-
bution of knowledge investments but whether the residents’ epistemic needs were
served fairly. The right amount of knowledge investment depends on what was
already known and what was found out during research. The fair distribution of
knowledge investments would be one that enabled everyone to determine whether it
was safe to return to their homes. Second, inequalities in the distribution of knowl-
7Frickel and colleagues are attuned to the normative complexity of the case and warn against
drawing hasty normative conclusions (Frickel et al., 2009, p. 130).
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edge can be the unintended outcome of policies and protocols that are determined
by their own logic. The EPA did not ask how much research it should allocate per
resident or per residential neighbourhood or how best it could serve the epistemic
needs of the residents of New Orleans. It followed a set of pre-defined sampling and
testing procedures for allocating research investments guided by the EPA’s institu-
tional mandate shaped by its own organizational priorities. Third, in line with this
second observation, distributive epistemic justice does not always track other injus-
tices. In this case, for instance, it was disadvantaged neighbourhoods that received
more knowledge investment. This should not surprise us. Even though existing
inequalities and relations of power influence the science that gets done, internal
factors–such as the current state of scientific knowledge, the availability of research
methods and tools, and what is seen as epistemically significant–also play a role.
Finally, just focusing on inequalities in research allocation at the point where it is
being directly applied would be short-sighted. As Frickel and Vincent note, solid
research on the carcinogenicity of many of the contaminants found in New Orleans
was lacking. Thus, even if the EPA took steps to serve every resident fairly there
would still be a distributive epistemic injustice.
One final clarification is necessary. Primary distributive justice does not require
that the knowledge needs of citizens should be satisfied no matter what. We may
decide, on reflection, that it would be too costly to determine the safety of all neigh-
bourhoods and that resources should be allocated to other more urgent needs. This
would not mean that primary distributive epistemic justice does not matter. Peo-
ple who could not find out if their neighbourhoods were safe or not would be due
some compensation because their justice based demands had not been fulfilled. A
consideration of justice that is outweighed by other such considerations still retains
some force.
5 Producing Knowledge Public Officials Need
The vast portion of the knowledge produced by science is highly technical and of
no direct use to laypeople. Ordinary citizens do not need to have deep or extensive
knowledge of medicine when they suffer from a health problem, their doctors do;
the knowledge forensic science provides, such as how blood and DNA analyses can
be used as evidence in courts, is needed by judges and lawyers more than ordinary
citizens; the same point applies to knowledge social sciences provide for social pol-
icy. All of these types of expert knowledge are crucial to the effective pursuit of
justice and benefit ordinary people indirectly. Therefore, justice requires that sci-
ence produce knowledge needed by public officials for the purposes of providing
health care, criminal justice, effective design and implementation of social policies.
Science can be a source of secondary distributive epistemic justice because it
plays a pivotal role in policy. If public officials lack the knowledge necessary for
the pursuit of justice, their efforts will be ineffective. If they act on unreliable or
biased research, they may commit injustices. Very often, a social problem becomes a
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public concern only when it is documented by scientific evidence (Weingart, 1999,
p. 155). If science neglects the interests of certain groups, the problems that plague
them are unlikely to be addressed. Thus, a theory of distributive epistemic justice in
science has to be attentive to science’s role in the formulation and implementation
of public policy.
Scientific research agendas must be set in such a way that the production of
knowledge that would benefit disadvantaged groups is not neglected. Consider
disparities in medical research. There is ‘a lack of a concerted research and develop-
ment effort to improve diagnostic testing methods or drugs and vaccine’ for some
tropical and parasitic diseases that inflict especially the poor and people of African
descent in the USA (Hotez, 2009). This constitutes a distributive epistemic injus-
tice, given that the United States has all the means to fill this knowledge gap.
Not just the allocation of resources but the design of clinical trials and the analy-
sis of data can be sources of distributive epistemic injustice. Perhaps the best-known
example in this context is research on coronary heart disease. Even though it has
been and still is the leading cause of death for women in the USA, it was considered
a ‘man’s disease’ until the 1990s. For this reason, women were either completely ex-
cluded from or underrepresented in relevant research populations. The well-known
‘The Physicians’ Health Study’ that investigated the effect of low-dose aspirin on
heart attack was carried out only on men. Based on the study, aspirin has been
routinely recommended for the primary prevention of heart attacks. That this rec-
ommendation did not apply to women was discovered only after a study was carried
out on exclusively women subjects. It concluded that aspirin has no such effect on
women if they are below 65 (Criado-Perez, 2019, pp. 217–8).8
As we observed in the previous section, distributive epistemic injustices do not
always track other patterns of inequality. The under-diagnosis of osteoporosis in
men provides further illustration. If someone has a bone mineral density 2.5 stan-
dard deviations below that of the mean of the reference group, they are diagnosed
with osteoporosis. The reference group up until 1997 was white women aged 20–29
years. This practice changed in 1997 thanks to data collected by the CDC. When
a reference group of males was used to diagnose osteoporosis in men, its estimated
prevalence in men went from 1%–4% to 3%–6% (Schiebinger and Klinge, 2013,
pp. 92–5).
These examples illustrate the disparate ways in which different groups face sec-
ondary distributive epistemic injustice. In all of these cases, the medical profession
lacked the necessary knowledge that would benefit their patients. The ultimate
cause was the poor social organization of medical research that prioritized the health
needs of some groups over others or neglected relevant differences.
Medical and drug research is, of course, not the only kind of research required
for the pursuit of justice. Social sciences are particularly relevant to the identifica-
8These are not isolated cases. Dusenbery, 2018, Criado-Perez, 2019, Schiebinger, 2020 and the
literature cited therein, present many other examples of gender bias in the production of scientific
knowledge especially in medicine but not confined to it and discuss the reasons behind the gendered
knowledge gap.
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tion and overcoming of injustices in the distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth. Research in forensic science and psychology are crucial for the criminal
justice system. Scientific research relevant to the pursuit of justice will not be lim-
ited to disciplines that directly contribute to policies because they often depend on
research across several disciplines that may appear very distant from policy. For
instance, forensic evidence such as DNA analysis that courts rely on is based on the
life sciences. Thus, the requirements of secondary distributive epistemic justice will
fall on many scientific disciplines.
It may be suggested that what we have called secondary distributive epistemic
injustice is not really an epistemic injustice because knowledge figures only as a
means to the realization of justice. It is true that injustices of this type do not
wrong individuals as knowers. However, their contribution to injustice is distinctly
epistemic: they are injustices societies commit or fail to remedy because of a lack of
knowledge. In certain instances, science is uniquely positioned to further or hinder
the pursuit of justice. To use the language of economics, scientific knowledge is not
always a substitutable input in the pursuit of justice. Certain social injustices are
discoverable only through scientific inquiry. If the public is unaware of an injustice
because the research that would uncover it is lacking, they cannot address it. Or
if existing research has failed to take the needs of certain groups into account, as
in the case of some health research, policies that aim to serve everyone fairly will
fail. In all of these cases, the scientific research that has been done or is lacking
will play an essential causal role in the existence of these non-epistemic injustices.
Whatever name we give them, the remedy will involve attending to the production
of scientific knowledge.
The boundaries between primary and secondary distributive epistemic injustices
are not too sharp in practice even though they are conceptually distinct. The line
between what officials serving the public need to know and what members of the
public need to know is sensitive to contextual factors—in particular, the division of
labour in a society. If people are carrying out a certain task themselves, they will
need to have the knowledge necessary for it. If there are specialized people who are
carrying out this task for them, it will be the specialists who need the knowledge.
People will only need to know how to identify competent specialists and how to
effectively interact with them. Compare these two different ways of ensuring that
people do not suffer from a certain disease. In the first, individuals take a preven-
tative measure that protects them against the disease. In the second, they don’t
take such a measure, but doctors treat the disease. Unfairness in the production
of scientific knowledge in the first case would be an instance of primary distribu-
tive epistemic injustice; in the second case it would be an instance of secondary
distributive epistemic injustice.
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6 The Injustice of Producing Ignorance
Distributive epistemic injustice occurs not just when science fails to produce knowl-
edge ordinary citizens and public officials need. It can also come about through the
suppression of existing knowledge or the wilful manufacturing of ignorance. These
are receiving increasing attention from historians and philosophers of science in the
newly emerging field of agnotology (see Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008; Kourany
and Carrier, 2020). The tobacco industry’s strategy of deliberate suppression of
scientific knowledge and manufacturing of ignorance by producing unreasonable
doubt about smoking’s causing lung cancer provides a well-documented example of
this phenomenon (Oreskes and Conway, 2011; Galison and Proctor, 2020).9 Our
account below relies on this body of research.
The year 1953 was a watershed both for medical research and the tobacco in-
dustry in the US. Researchers had obtained significant evidence linking smoking
to lung cancer. They had found that cigarette tar applied to the skin of mice caused
deadly cancers. Within less than a decade the medical research community estab-
lished beyond any reasonable doubt that smoking was a major cause of lung cancer.
The US surgeon general’s report of 1964 announced the emerging consensus to the
public.
Since the 1953 finding was widely covered in the media, the tobacco industry
immediately organized to defend itself by setting up a public relations program.
The overall strategy of the program was to create unreasonable doubt about the
causal relation between smoking and cancer. The program was headed by eminent
scientists, first by Clarence C. Little, a geneticist who was a member of the National
Academy of Sciences, and then by Frederick Seitz, a physicist who was the president
of the National Academy of Sciences in the 1960s. Their strategy had three pillars.
The first pillar consisted of supporting what Robert Proctor calls ‘distraction
science’ (Galison and Proctor, 2020, p. 29). This means funding research not about
the impact of tobacco on health, but rather about other possible causes of cancer.
Such research was then used to argue that because cancer could have other causes
and not everybody who smokes gets it, science had not yet ‘proven’ the required
causation.
The second pillar was to handpick some scientists, promote their tobacco indus-
try friendly views and employ them as witnesses in courts. To give just one example,
in a famous court case against Philip Morris in 1997, Martin Cline, a distinguished
biomedical researcher at the UCLA’s medical school, testified that although smok-
ing is linked to certain types of cancer at the population level, there was no scientific
evidence at the individual level. During the trial Cline admitted that he received
three million dollars from the tobacco industry to support his research.
The final pillar consisted of disseminating the fruits of the first two to doctors,
journalists, and Congress members to inform them that there was ‘another side’.
9Deliberate production of ignorance using science is not confined to the smoking-cancer example.
It extends to acid rain, the ozone hole, global warming, and packaged food. See (Oreskes and Conway,
2011 and Moss, 2013).
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The media, which adhered to the supposedly objective practice of balanced report-
ing, was thereby made to serve the tobacco industry’s ends. Journalists presented
both sides of the issue regarding smoking-cancer link as if they were equally sup-
ported by evidence.
This three-pillar strategy succeeded in creating significant doubt in the minds
of ordinary citizens well into the 1980s, thus contributing to primary distributive
epistemic injustice. But to the extent it delayed the decisions of the courts and
the Congress, it further caused a secondary distributive epistemic injustice. The
Congress waited until 2009 to authorize the FDA to regulate tobacco as an addictive
drug, and the tobacco industry was found guilty for scheming to deceive consumers
just three years earlier. Their researchers knew already back in the early 1960s that
smoking caused cancer, in addition to being addictive because of the nicotine it
contains. The wrong done to the public was clearly epistemic, but the harm it
caused was deadly.
The tobacco industry’s strategy to mislead the public and public officials reveals
an important point: justice in the production of science is not just about the conduct
of individual researchers. What matters is the overall pattern of scientific research
that emerges. Individual conduct, which is not problematic when viewed in isola-
tion, may be troublesome as part of a broader pattern. The public and its officials
may be misled—without any researcher committing fraud or engaging in question-
able research practices—through selective support for and selective sharing of some
research (Weatherall et al., 2020). In other words, the account of distributive epis-
temic justice we develop in this article is what Elizabeth Anderson calls a ‘structural
theory’. It seeks to provide ‘criteria for assessing global properties of a system of
rules that govern transactions and imposes constraints on permissible rules with an
eye toward controlling the cumulative effects of individual transactions that may be
innocent from a local point of view’ (Anderson, 2012, p. 164). Thus, the thought is
not that each researcher should ask themselves ‘What research should I do to serve
justice?’. Such an approach would face insurmountable coordination problems and
be unhelpful. Rather, the structural factors that shape scientific research (such as
funding decisions, the incentive system of science, journal policies, the distribution
of opportunities that determines who gets to be a scientist, and so on) should be
organized in such a way that science serves justice.
7 Justice in Epistemic Risk Distribution
Following Rudner [1953], Heather Douglas has argued that values play an inelim-
inable role in science [2009]. Inductive inferences always come with the risk of
rejecting a true hypothesis or accepting a false hypothesis. Since often we cannot
minimize both risks at the same time, we need to choose one of them to minimize.
This choice will reflect our value assessment of the consequences of the two types of
errors. Biddle and Kukla have argued that the risk of error is not limited to inductive
inferences [2017]. The operationalization of concepts, the inclusion or exclusion of
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borderline data points, the choice of models, diagnostic criteria for medical con-
ditions all face risks of error. Thus, they argue for the existence of ‘epistemic risk’,
a broader category which encompasses ‘any risk of epistemic error that arises any-
where during knowledge practices’ (Biddle and Kukla, 2017, p. 218). Since people
may have competing interests in avoiding certain kinds of errors, or the policies that
are based on different epistemic risk judgments may impact their interests differ-
ently, the assignment of epistemic risk also raises questions of distributive epistemic
justice.
Recall that in Sections 4 and 5 we focused on two roles played by science: pro-
viding individuals with the knowledge they need and providing public officials with
the knowledge necessary for the pursuit of justice. In both of these roles, justice
bears on how epistemic risks should be assigned. The importance of avoiding cer-
tain erroneous beliefs may not be the same for all individuals. When this is the case,
scientists’ choice of how to allocate epistemic risk will affect individuals’ compara-
tive opportunity to acquire knowledge they need. A fine-tuned approach looking
at every individual’s claims and every proposition would be hopelessly complicated
and inefficient. Rather, we should seek to avoid systemic injustices. We should
consider whether there are groups or weighty interests that are neglected when sci-
entists assign epistemic risks. Since epistemic risk management is ‘often embedded
in institutional practices and structures’, the problem should be tackled through at-
tending to the underlying social forces that shape this process, such as sources of
funding and who gets to participate in science (Biddle and Kukla, 2017, p. 217; see
also Wilholt, 2013.
How epistemic risks are assigned in scientific research that informs public pol-
icy can directly impact public welfare and cause secondary distributive epistemic
injustices (Elliott, 2011). The epistemic risk involved in diagnosing heart attack
provides an example. If the criteria for it are specified too narrowly, one can miss
genuine heart attacks and fail to treat them. If they are specified too broadly, one
wrongly characterizes someone as having a heart attack, causing unnecessary anxi-
ety and treatment. Hence, as Biddle and Kukla point out, the choice of diagnostic
criteria carries epistemic risk ([2017], p. 229). Until recently, such criteria for heart
attack were based on typical symptoms experienced by men, such as crushing chest
pain and shooting pain down the left arm. As it turns out, in addition to chest
pain which is typical, women can have a number of different symptoms such as
pain in the neck and throat, nausea and vomiting, dizziness and even insomnia. As
a result, doctors have tended to mis- or under-diagnose and consequently under-
treat women’s heart problems (Dusenbery, 2018, pp. 219–20; Criado-Perez, 2019,
pp. 217–9; Schiebinger, 2020, p. 281). The root of the harm done to women in this
context is a clear case of an unfair epistemic risk distribution: Diagnostic criteria
for heart attack were defined too narrowly in favour of men.
The unfairness of epistemic risk distribution in the diagnosis of heart disease is
not limited to the criteria for heart attacks. Standard diagnostic tools such as elec-
trocardiogram, stress tests and even angiography are also less conclusive in women
compared to men (Criado-Perez, 2019, p. 219; Schiebinger, 2020, p. 282). This
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systemic problem has structural causes rooted in the way medical profession has
historically arisen and developed. In a nutshell, it was due to taking males as ‘the
prototype of the human research subject’ (Dresser, 1992, p. 27). The exclusion
of women from research populations and the ensuing ‘knowledge gap’ has been
systemic and not unique to the study of coronary heart diseases (DeBruin, 1994;
Dresser, 1992; Schiebinger, 2014). Even when women are included in clinical
studies, scientists do not always carry out gender analysis of their data to see if the
gender of the research subjects affects the findings. Since the problem is structural,
it needs to be addressed accordingly.10
Questions of justice also arise for the allocation of epistemic risk in research
that will be an input to public policy because it influences how effectively a so-
ciety complies with the requirements of justice. Suppose that scientists adopt a
very high standard for accepting and asserting that a certain chemical is harmful to
public health. Their adoption of this standard will make it less likely that its use
will be restricted. Or suppose that scientists opt for a narrow definition of a given
disease. This will mean that many people who would otherwise receive treatment
will not (Biddle, 2016). In both of these cases, insofar as scientists’ assignment of
epistemic risk neglects or undervalues social ends that have priority, their research
will hinder the pursuit of justice. These choices regarding epistemic risk come prior
to deliberation about public policies and the identification of injustices that need
to be corrected. For this reason, they can be hard to detect even though they can
have substantial effects. Theories of justice that do not attend to the production of
scientific knowledge will fail to account for them.
8 Discriminatory andDistributiveEpistemic Injustice inSci-
ence
Several philosophers have noted that testimonial injustice occurs in medical set-
tings, when health professionals ‘allow a negative stereotype of illness to prejudice
their perception and evaluation of the credibility of an ill speaker’ (Carel and Kidd,
2017, p. 338). Doctors sometimes dismiss female patients’ reports of their symp-
toms due to ‘cultural stereotypes regarding femininity’ (Grasswick, 2017, p. 315).
This kind of testimonial injustice does not only affect those whose testimony is dis-
regarded; it affects all future patients like them since valuable medical information
is cast aside as irrelevant. This contributes to the existing knowledge gap regarding
women’s health and thereby to distributive epistemic injustice. The dialectic here
works in the other direction as well. The testimonial injustice suffered by female
patients is exacerbated by the existing distributive epistemic injustice in medicine.
When doctors are not trained about the differences in the way men and women ex-
perience certain disease symptoms, when the medical establishment is impaired by
the systemic knowledge gap more generally, testimonial injustice becomes highly
10For attempts in this direction, see Schiebinger, 2020, pp. 294–7 Schiebinger [2020] and the
literature cited therein.
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likely. Therefore, we should be vigilant about the possible interactions between
discriminatory injustices, like testimonial injustice, and distributive epistemic in-
justices since one may compound the other.11
Testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are not the only discriminatory epis-
temic injustices. Suppose a teacher fails to uptake a student’s questions or sug-
gestions intended as a contribution to an ongoing discussion due to prejudice or
stereotype. This is a distinct discriminatory injustice: the student does not nec-
essarily suffer from a credibility deficit or lack of conceptual resources (Hookway,
2010). Grasswick calls such injustices ‘participatory epistemic injustices’ since some
one’s ‘capacity to contribute to cooperative inquiry as an epistemic agent is stymied’
(Grasswick, 2017, p. 316). She notes that such injustices can also occur in the con-
text of science and distinguishes between two types. First, it can occur within the
scientific community when some scientists do not give due attention or credit to
other scientists because of prejudice, stereotype, gender or racial bias.12 Second,
it can occur when scientists ignore laypeople’s relevant ‘local knowledge’ in their
interactions with them (Grasswick, 2017, pp. 317–8).
Participatory injustices in science, whether against other scientists or laypeople,
can cause distributive epistemic injustice. Consider Grasswick’s ([2017]) example
of the latter: the interactions between UK scientists and sheep farmers in Cum-
bria following the Chernobyl disaster. Wynne’s case study, which Grasswick draws
from, demonstrates this. Scientists ignored sheep farmers’ knowledge about local
environmental conditions and sheep behaviour due to their prejudice against them
as epistemic agents (Wynne, 1992, Wynne, 1998). This participatory epistemic in-
justice, in turn, caused a distributive one: because they did not take sheep farmers’
local knowledge into account, scientists understood the effects of the radioactive
fallout on sheep farming in Cumbria poorly. While the farmers’ local knowledge
was certainly not scientific, scientists’ ignoring it made their knowledge of the ef-
fects of radioactive fallout in complex natural environmental conditions unreliable.
As a result, both the relevant scientific community and the people living in the area
were unfairly deprived of valuable scientific knowledge.
Participatory injustices within the scientific community cause distributive epis-
temic justices because who gets to fully participate in science affects both what is
researched and how it is researched. Such injustices harm not only the scientists
who cannot participate fully in scientific research, but also members of the public
who would benefit from their contributions.
Participatory injustices affect what gets researched because scientists pursue not
just any truth but scientifically significant truths. As Kitcher has argued, what
counts as a scientifically significant question is not context-independent. It is shaped,
in part, by the social and ethical values of scientists and the society they belong to
(Kitcher, 2001, pp. 63–82). When there is participatory injustice within a research
11A similar point is also made by (Anderson, 2012, p. 169 and Koskinen and Rolin, 2019, p. 1059).
12Since injustices within the community of scientists is largely beyond the scope of our paper, we
leave this issue aside.
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community, some groups have less power to shape what counts as scientifically
significant—either because they are underrepresented in the community or because
their voices are not heard. Judgments of scientific significance that influence which
research is valued and pursued, end up reflecting the interests and needs of some
groups over others, resulting in distributive epistemic injustice.
Participatory injustice within science also influences the conduct of research.
It can, for instance, affect the operationalization of scientific concepts. Consider
the history of the operationalization of gross domestic product (GDP), which has
become a standard measure for the economic performance of countries. As femi-
nist economists have pointed out, GDP primarily measures market production and
excludes unpaid care work, which is often done by women (Waring, 1988). Re-
markably, this criticism has existed since the initial development of GDP. Phyllis
Deane, who was working closely with the economists who developed the modern
method of national income accounting and GDP, had argued for, and devised ways
to measure, the inclusion of home production. When the United Nations adopted
the System of National Accounts, this critique was not heeded. While the partici-
patory injustice women economists suffered is probably not the only reason, Luke
Messac’s research suggests that it played a role. The expert committees who de-
vised the international standards for national income accounting had few female
members—and it was the women members of these committees who emphasized
the importance of incorporating household production in GDP (Messac, 2018).
Given the centrality of GDP to public discourse, this way of counting domestic
production has shaped public policy. It has also meant unpaid care work went un-
recognized and those who carried it out lacked an economic measure of their con-
tributions. In this instance, participatory injustice within the scientific community
contributed to secondary distributive epistemic injustice.
9 Conclusion
In this article we have focused on one aspect of distributive epistemic justice in sci-
ence, namely, the requirements of justice in the production of scientific knowledge.
We have identified several distinct ways in which injustices can occur in this context:
by systematically failing to meet the knowledge needs of ordinary citizens and pub-
lic officials who serve them; by enabling the production of ignorance; and by unfair
management of epistemic risks. Moreover, we have underlined how distributive,
testimonial and participatory injustices may feedback onto each other.
Primary distributive epistemic justice is about people’s opportunity to acquire
knowledge. Suppose the institutions of science do their part. People may still not
enjoy their fair share of the opportunity to acquire knowledge. This knowledge
may not be disseminated fairly and reliably. Or people may lack the education that
would enable them to make use of the knowledge offered them. Thus, institutions
of media and education also play a crucial role in determining people’s opportunity
to acquire knowledge. The tobacco industry’s deliberate manufacturing of ignorance
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by creating unreasonable doubt in the minds of the public provides a good example
of how all three processes are involved. As we have seen, there was well-conducted
scientific research on the impact of smoking on lung cancer. The injustice incurred
on citizens was, rather, largely due to the tobacco industry’s bombarding them as
well as health professionals, members of the Congress and above all journalists with
‘distraction science’. The US media’s so-called ‘balanced reporting’ played a major
role in confusing the public. A more nuanced science reporting is no doubt es-
sential for distributive epistemic justice. This case also draws our attention to the
importance of education. A public better educated about how science works, the
basics of causation, and which experts to trust would certainly be less influenced by
strategic ploys of the kind made by the tobacco industry.
Secondary distributive epistemic justice, which is about the knowledge needs of
those who serve the public, also depends on the well-functioning of the epistemic
basic structure as a whole. Consider the gender disparities in health research dis-
cussed in Section 5. Individual researchers cannot, by themselves, change research
priorities. Funding bodies and regulatory agencies need to fund and incentivize
research to address these disparities. Journals should encourage the gender analysis
of data. Such improvements will not change medical practice unless the results of
studies that pay attention to gender differences are incorporated into the medical
curriculum.
This is just another way of saying that distributive epistemic justice in science
is a holistic matter. Achieving it depends on the fair organization and the well-
functioning not just of the institution of science, but also of the epistemic basic
structure as a whole.
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